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WARNING: THIS CLAIM WILL NOT SELF-DESTRUCT IN
SIX MONTHS-THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIES A
STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO CLAIMS
ARISING UNDER THE 1988 WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND
RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT
United Paperworkers International Union Local 340 v. Specialty
Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
In United Paperworkers International Union Local 340 v. Specialty
Paperboard, Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that state law,2 rather than the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA),a provides the appropriate statute of limitations4 for actions
arising under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of
1988 (WARN). 5
Defendant Specialty Paperboard, Inc. (SPI) sold its paper mill to co-
defendant Rock-Tenn. Co. (RTC).6 Upon the sale, SPI fired all 232 of the
mill's employees.' RTC, however, immediately rehired 141 of these
terminated employees!
The United Paperworkers International Union and Local 340 subsequent-
ly filed suit9 in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont
1. 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
2. The issue of which state statute a court should utilize, in the event that state law is applicable,
is beyond the scope of this Case Comment. For a brief discussion of how courts have analyzed this
issue, see generally Kimberly Jade Norwood, Falling Back to the Future with 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A
Limitations Period with Real Limitations, 69 IND. L. REV. 477 (1994).
3. Section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988), provides in relevant part: "[N]o
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the
filing of the charge with the [National Labor Relations] Board and the service of a copy thereof upon
the person against whom such charge is made .... " 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
4. "As often happens, Congress failed to provide WARN with a statute of limitations, leaving
it to the courts to find an appropriate period." United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 52-53. For a
thorough discussion of other instances in which Congress has omitted specific statutes of limitations
from federal laws and how courts have addressed the resulting confusion, see generally Norwood, supra
note 2.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988). Generally, WARN requires that an employer notify
employees sixty days prior to closing a plant or effecting a mass layoff. Id. § 2102. See also infra
notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
6. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 52. The sale took place on March 15, 1991. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The complaint was a class action under 29 U.S.C § 2104(a)(5) (1988). United Paperworkers,
999 F.2d at 52.
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on behalf of the workers whom RTC did not rehire.'" The union tt
asserted that the defendants 2 had failed to give notice to employees as
required by WARN. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the claim as time-barred under the NLRA statute of limitations.13
The court found that the appropriate statute of limitations was not the
NLRA's six month statute of limitations but Vermont's civil actions statute
of limitations. t4  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed 5 and held that
because the NLRA is not closely analogous to WARN 6 and because
using a state statue of limitations would not undermine the federal policy
behind WARN, 7 courts should borrow from state law when determining
the statute of limitations for WARN claims.'"
Congress passed WARN on August 4, 1988," after fifteen years of
debate over national plant closing notification legislation.2" WARN
requires that employers with 100 or more employees notify workers at least
sixty days2 before closing a plant 2 or initiating a mass layoff.2"
10. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 52. WARN specifically provides for a civil action for
damages in federal court for aggrieved employees. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
11. WARN allows either individual employees or their representative to bring suit against the
employer. However, WARN does not require the aggrieved employees to be union members. See 29
U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1988).
12. 'WARN contains specific provisions allocating notification responsibility among the parties
involved in the sale of a corporation or individual plant. See id. § 2101(b)(l). The Second Circuit did
not address this issue, however. For a brief discussion of this provision, see John O'Connor, Employers
Be Forewarned: An Employer's Guide to Plant Closings and Layoff Decisions Afier the Enactment of
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 16 OHio N.U. L. REv. 19, 48 (1989).
13. United Papenvorkers, 999 F.2d at 52.
14. The statute of limitations for civil actions in Vermont is six years. Id.
15. Id. at 56.
16. Id. at 52.
17. Id. at 54-55.
18. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.
19. WARN became effective six months later on February 4, 1989. See O'Connor, supra note
12, at 19-20.
For a discussion of potential constitutional challenges to WARN, see Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co. v.
Lewiston-Aubum Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, 320 A.2d 247 (Me. 1974) (rejecting Due Process and
Equal Protection Clause challenges to Maine's plant-closing notification law) and O'Connor, supra note
12, at 50-55 (concluding that WARN will survive any constitutional attacks). See also Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1987) (rejecting an employer's claim that Maine's plant-
closing law was pre-empted by the NLRA).
20. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 43 ("National plant closing notification legislation was so
controversial that it took fifteen years before such a bill could make it through both the House and
Senate.").
21. Section 2102 provides in pertinent part:
[A]n employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period
after the employer serves written notice of such an order-
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Congress adopted WARN to address the perceived national problem of
worker displacement, which had arisen because an increasing number of
businesses had scaled back on production and employment.2 Under
WARN, an employer who fails to provide the prescribed notice is liable for
back pay and lost benefits to those workers suffering an employment
loss." The infringing employer must account for each day of violation,
up to sixty days.26 WARN specifically provides aggrieved employees
with a civil action for damages in federal court.2 The remedies provided
are exclusive under WARN,28 and the specific language of the statute
reflects that WARN's congressional sponsors did not intend to alter the
balance of pre-existing federal labor law.29 Congress did not, however,
(1) to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice or, if there
is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (1988).
22. "Plant closing" is defined as:
[T]he permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more
facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an
employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more
employees excluding any part-time employees.
29 U.S.C § 2101(a)(2) (1988).
23. "Mass layoff' is defined as:
[A] reduction in force which-
(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day
period for -
(i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (1988).
24. See 133 CONG. REC. 3725 (1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1045 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078, 2078 ("[T]he Conferees
reaffirm that advance notice is an essential component of a successful worker readjustment program.").
See also 134 CONG. REc. 15,518 (1988) (statement of Sen. Gore); S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1987); O'Connor, supra note 12, at 44-45.
25. "Employment loss" is defined, in part, as "(A) an employment termination, other than a
discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement, (B) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a
reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent during each month of any 6-month period." 29
U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6) (1988).
26. Section 2104(a)(1) provides that an employer who violates § 2102 shall be liable for back pay
and benefits, including certain medical expenses. Id. § 2104(a)(1).
27. Id. § 2104(a)(5).
28. Id. § 2104(b).
29. See 134 CONG. REc. S 16,098 (daily ed., June 28, 1988) (statements of Sens. Metzenbaum,
Specter, Hatch). Section 2105 reads as follows: "The rights and remedies provided to employees by
this chapter are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies
of the employees, and are not intended to alter or affect such rights and remedies ...." 29 U.S.C. §
2105 (1988).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
include an express statute of limitations in the text of WARN.3"
Congress' failure to include a statute of limitations in WARN leaves the
question of the appropriate limitations period to the judiciary. In UA W v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,3 the Supreme Court enunciated a general rule
for "borrowing" a statute of limitations. The Court cited precedent32
which indicated that when a federal statute lacks an express statute of
limitations, courts should look to state law to supply the limitations
period.33 The Court then applied a state statute of limitations to an action
brought by terminated employees under the Labor Management Relations
Act.3 4 While acknowledging that federal labor policy is an arena that
"peculiarly calls for uniform law,"35 the Court declined to stray from the
general rule of borrowing from state law, absent evidence that using the
state statute would frustrate the goals of federal labor policy. 6
Later, in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,37 the
Supreme Court clarified and ultimately relied upon the potential frustration
30. See supra note 4.
31. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
32. Id. at 704 (citing Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830)).
33. Id. The Hoosier Court interpreted these prior decisions as requiring courts to apply state
limitations periods as a matter of federal law when Congress does not provide a statute of limitations.
Id. at 704-05. This proposition was later rejected in DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151 (1983). See infra notes 38, 40 and accompanying text; see also Norwood, supra note 2,
at 482-83 n.34.
34. Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 707. The employees were seeking recovery of accumulated vacation pay.
Id. at 698. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides the mechanism for
filing "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1988).
35. Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 701 (quoting Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103
(1962)). The Hoosier Court agreed with the reasoning in Lucas Flour that uniformity of laws is
necessary to encourage the formation of collective bargaining agreements, which are considered the
chief instruments of federal labor policy. Id. at 702. However, the Court was not entirely persuaded
that uniformity was a necessary component of all aspects of the collective bargaining process. Id. at
703. See infra note 36.
For a strong argument in favor of federal borrowing for uniformity purposes, see generally Norwood,
supra note 2.
36. The Court noted that statute of limitations issues are implicated only after the collective
bargaining process breaks down. Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 702. Accordingly, the Court opined that "lack
of uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any way the achievement of any significant
goal of labor policy." Id. Though the Court apparently interpreted prior decisions to require it to apply
a state limitations period, see supra note 35, its discussion of the uniformity considerations seems to
suggest that under different circumstances, the Court would have considered borrowing federal law.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
37. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
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of federal labor policy exception to the use of state limitations periods
suggested in Hoosier." The DelCostello Court applied the NLRA's six-
month time limitation to a "hybrid" section 301/duty of fair representation
claim39 filed by an employee against both his employer and the union.4"
Although the Court conceded that the usual procedure was to borrow
statutes of limitations from state law, it did not believe courts must do so
as a matter of law.4' The Court stated that "when [1] a rule from
elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available
state statutes, and [2] the federal policies at stake42 and the practicalities
of litigation43 make that rule a [better] vehicle for interstitial law-making,"
the federal statute of limitations should be borrowed.' Citing the close
analogy between the NLRA's purpose of protecting collective bargaining"s
38. Citing Holmberg v. Annbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), the DelCostello Court held:
[N]either [the] Erie [doctrine] nor the Rules of Decision Act can now be taken as establishing
a mandatory rule that we apply state law in federal interstices. Indeed, the contrary view
urged by respondents cannot be reconciled... with our suggestion in Hoosier that we might
not apply state limitations periods in a different case.
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 160.
39. In contrast to the straightforward § 301 claim present in Hoosier, see supra note 34, the
lawsuit filed in DelCostello combined a § 301 claim against the employer with a claim against the
union under the NLRA for failure to provide adequate representation. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164.
The Court determined that because the hybrid claim directly affects the collective bargaining process,
it differed from a straight § 301 claim, which is more analogous to a breach of contract action. Id. at
165. See also Norwood, supra note 2, at 501. The Court found the hybrid claim analogous to an unfair
labor practice claim under the NLRA. 462 U.S. at 169.
40. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172. The plaintiff worked as a truck driver and was a member of
Teamsters Local 557. Id. at 155. He quit or was discharged from his job after refusing to drive an
allegedly unsafe truck. Id. After unsuccessfully following the union grievance procedure, he filed suit
in the District of Maryland against both his employer and the union. Id.
41. Id. at 171-72. See supra note 38; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161 ("In some circumstances,
however, state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law.
In those instances, it may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules
at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.").
42. The Court gave particular weight to the federal interests in uniformity and the rapid resolution
of labor disputes. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 171.
43. In analyzing the "practicalities of litigation" for a hybrid claim, the Court examined filing
requirements and the effect on the parties of varying time limitations. Id. at 165-69.
44. Id. at 172.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988). The NLRA's declaration of purpose and policy states in pertinent
part:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of commerce,
to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting
commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by
either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in
their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and
proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are
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and the dispute in the claim at issue, the Court found the exception satisfied
and dismissed a claim filed more than ten months after accrual was time-
barred.46
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the federal borrowing
exception in Reed v. United Transportation Union.47  The plaintiff, a
union officer, filed suit against the union under section 101(a)(2) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195948 alleging a
violation of his right to free speech concerning union matters. 49  The
Fourth Circuit, construing DelCostello, had applied the NLRA's six month
statute of limitations and had dismissed the claim as time-barred." The
Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Fourth Circuit, held that
section 101(a)(2) claims are governed by limitations periods found in state
personal injury statutes."' The Reed Court characterized the federal
borrowing exception as "closely circumscribed"52 and counseled that resort
to federal borrowing will be "unusual."53 In light of the mere "tangential
and remote"'54 effects of section 101(a)(2) litigation on the collective
bargaining relationship55 and the practical aspects of such litigation which
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor
disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988).
46. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172. The Court found that the NLRA was designed to balance the
same interests, those of employee, union, and employer, at stake in the case before it. Id. at 171. Thus,
the Court concluded that the NLRA was clearly more analogous than either the state limitations period
for vacating an arbitration award, id. at 165-167, or the limitations period for legal malpractice, id. at
167-68.
47. 488 U.S. 319 (1989).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1988). The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA) generally protects a union member's rights of freedom of speech and assembly in the labor
organization context. Id.
49. Local 1715 of the United Transportation Union reimbursed Reed, Secretary and Treasurer of
Local 1715, for time spent on union duties. Id. at 321-22. After an audit, the union disallowed Reed's
reimbursement, yet continued, over Reed's protests, to reimburse other officers. Id. at 322. Reed
eventually filed suit alleging that the disallowance of payments amounted to harassment for views he
had expressed on union matters. Id.
50. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 828 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1987), affd, 488 U.S. 319
(1989).
51. "Because § 101(a)(2) protects rights of free speech and assembly, and was patterned after the
First Amendment, it is readily analogized for the purpose of borrowing a statute of limitations to state
personal injury actions." Reed, 488 U.S. at 326.
52. Id. at 324.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 330.
55. While acknowledging that a § 101(a)(2) claim might indirectly affect collective bargaining
relationships, the Court characterized the claim as essentially an "internal union dispute." Id. Thus,
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necessitate uniformity,56 the Court refused to depart from the general rule
of borrowing from state law. 7
Finally, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson,5"
its most recent decision on the subject, the Supreme Court applied a federal
statute of limitations to a claim59 that arose under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' While reaffirming the general rule of
state borrowing,6' the Court extracted from prior cases a three-part test for
determining whether the federal borrowing exception should apply. 2
First, a court must evaluate the cause of action to determine whether it
requires a uniform statute of limitations.63 Second, assuming a uniform
limitations period is appropriate, the court must decide, giving particular
weight to the geographic character of the claim,' whether the appropriate
statute of limitations is to come from state or federal law.65 Third, even
if the second consideration is satisfied, a court must still find that the
federal source provides a closer analogy to the claim than any applicable
state law.66
Subsequently, the district courts that have addressed the issue of
it was outside the scope of the typical collective bargaining processes contemplated by the NLRA. Id.
at 331.
56. The Court determined that practical problems of litigation present in a hybrid suit, see supra
note 43, were simply not present in an individual claim under § 101(a)(2). Reed, 488 U.S. at 328. The
Court explained that "state personal injury statutes are of sufficient length to accommodate the practical
difficulties faced by § 101(a)(2) plaintiffs, which include identifying the injury, deciding in the first
place to bring suit against and thereby antagonize union leadership, and finding an attorney." Id. at 327
(citations omitted).
57. Reed, 488 U.S. at 334.
58. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
59. The plaintiffs-respondents were investors in a failed computer hardware leasing partnership.
Id. at 2776. They brought suit against a law firm that had aided in setting up the partnership, alleging
fraud and misrepresentation. Id. at 2776-77.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
61. "Rooted as it is in the expectations of Congress, the 'state-borrowing doctrine' may not be
lightly abandoned." Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
62. Id. at 2778-79.
63. The Court stated that when a cause of action is so varied or complex that a single state
limitations period cannot consistently be applied within a jurisdiction, courts should adopt one source,
or class of sources, for borrowing purposes to encourage predictability and judicial economy. Id. at
2779 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273 (1985)).
64. Generally, multistate litigation presents a greater risk of forum shopping if state statutes are
borrowed. Id. at 2779.
65. Id.
66. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2779. The Court noted that this determination will obviously vary based
upon the statutes available for comparison, but factors such as "commonality of purpose" and "similarity
of elements" are important. Id.
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borrowing a statute of limitations for WARN have diverged sharply in their
application of the Lampf and DelCostello tests. 67 In Newspaper and Mail
Deliverers' Union v. United Magazine Co.,68 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York became the first court to decide
whether state or federal law should provide the limitations period for
WARN claims. After loosely applying the DelCostello inquiry, the court
held that the NLRA's six month limitation should apply to WARN claims
and dismissed the plaintiffs suit as time-barred.69 The United Magazine
court relied heavily on the Second Circuit's reasoning in Phelan v. Local
305,70 which addressed the borrowing issue in a labor law context other
than WARN.71 The district court interpreted Phelan as directing courts
to apply the DelCostello exception literally7 2 and to borrow the NLRA
limitations period whenever the substantive claim would have an effect on
the collective bargaining relationship. 73
Though a WARN claim is not within the direct purview of the NLRA,7
the United Magazine court reasoned that because a WARN suit is a dispute
between a union, on behalf of employees, and an employer, it closely
parallels the type of conflict the NLRA was designed to resolve.75 The
court also noted that the term "representative" in WARN is defined by
67. The Lampf Court used a three-step test to decide whether to borrow federal statutes of
limitations, while the DelCostello Court used only two steps. However, the tests are essentially
interchangeable. The second step in the DelCostello test, an inquiry into the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation accompanying a particular cause of action, see supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text, essentially encompasses the first and third steps of the Lampf inquiry, see supra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text. Courts have used both tests. See e.g., Automobile Mechanics'
Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (applying the Lampfthree-
step inquiry); UnitedPaperworkers, 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (utilizing the DelCostello test); Wallace
v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (applying DelCostello test).
68. 809 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Upon reconsideration, the court granted a motion for entry
ofjudgment in favor of the defendant-employer on the statute of limitations issue. Newspaper and Mail
Deliverers' Union v. United Magazine Co., 829 F. Supp. 561, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
69. United Magazine, 809 F. Supp. at 191-193.
70. 973 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1415 (1993).
71. The claim at issue in Phelan was filed by union members against a sister local for alleged
violations of the LMRDA. Id. at 1054-55.
72. United Magazine, 809 F. Supp. at 190 ("[C]ourts should not limit the DelCostello reasoning
to its specific facts.') (citing Phelan, 973 F.2d at 1060).
73. Id. at 190. The United Magazine court read Phelan as advocating the continued use of state
limitations periods for claims involving internal union disputes. Id. at 191.
74. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 48.
75. United Magazine, 809 F. Supp. at 191 ("The policy behind the NLRA is to alleviate turmoil
in the relationship between management and labor so that disputes do not limit the flow of interstate
commerce."). See also supra note 45.
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reference to provisions of the NLRA.76 As a final justification for
applying the NLRA statute of limitations, the court stated that WARN's
limited compensatory remedy of sixty-days salary favored applying the
shorter six-month limitation period."
Recently, two other district courts applied the NLRA statute of
limitations to suits filed under WARN. In Staudt v. Glastron, Inc. ,7 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas closely
followed the reasoning employed in United Magazine and noted that no
Texas statute provided a closer analogy to WARN than the NLRA.7
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, in Halkias v. General Dynamics,"0 concurred with Staudt and
United Magazine, stating that the NLRA limitations period better promotes
the dual federal policies of uniformity and rapid resolution of labor
disputes."1
However, another group of district courts has instead opted to borrow
state statutes of limitations for claims arising under WARN. In Wallace v.
Detroit Coke Corp.,s2 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan refused to apply the six-month limitations period of
the NLRA to a WARN cause of action. 3 The court emphasized that
DelCostello was a limited exception to the general rule that courts should
borrow state limitations and was not meant to make the NLRA's limitations
period apply to all labor cases." The court noted that Congress did not
intend WARN to affect existing legislation."5 According to the court,
because WARN rights have no direct relationship to collective bargaining
76. United Magazine, 809 F. Supp. at 191. WARN defines "representative" as "an exclusive
representative of employees within the meaning of section 159(a) or 158(f) of this title [NLRA]" 29
U.S.C. § 2101(4) (1988).
77. United Magazine, 809 F. Supp. at 192. The court considered WARN's limited damage remedy
as an indication that WARN's underlying goal was to provide immediate, temporary aid to dislocated
workers. Such an assumption supports the adoption of a shorter limitations period. Id.
78. No. SA-92-CA-1174, 1993 WL 85356 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1993).
79. Id. at *2. The court further relied on WARN's limited remedy and its incorporation of NLRA
definitions. Id.
80. 825 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
81. Id. at 125. The court was particularly concerned with achieving uniformity, as the same
employer had laid off workers in three different states. Id.
82. 818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
83. Id. at 195.
84. Id. at 196 ("DelCostello is not a 'green light' to apply [Section 10(b)'s limitations period] to
all actions in which federal labor law is implicated.") (quoting Carruthers Ready-Mix, Inc. v. Cement
Masons Local Union, 779 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1985)).
85. Id. at 196 (citing S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987)).
1994]
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procedures and WARN plaintiffs are not required to be union members, 86
the NLRA is not closely analogous to WARN.87
In Automobile Mechanics' Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Services,88
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois utilized
the Lampf three-step inquiry89 to determine that courts should not apply
the NLRA statute of limitations to WARN claims. Initially, the court
reasoned that because WARN gives rise to only one type of claim,90 it is
not a cause of action that would likely engender inconsistent applications
of limitations periods within a single state." Second, a WARN claim is
inherently limited to the specific plant closing or layoff about which the
employee was not told,92 indicating that geographic concerns do not
warrant adopting a federal statute.93 Finally, the court distinguished
WARN from the NLRA by noting the employer-employee relationship may
have terminated before a WARN claim is filed.94 By contrast, NLRA
claims arise from continuing relationships.9" Because the Lampf standard
for federal borrowing was not satisfied, the court declined to adopt the
86. See supra notes 5, 11 and accompanying text. The court determined that because WARN
includes non-union members in its notice requirement, it falls outside the scope of the collective
bargaining process. Wallace, 818 F. Supp. at 196.
87. Wallace, 818 F. Supp. at 196. Accordingly, the court applied Michigan's six year statute of
limitations for breach of contract Id. at 197.
In Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp. 651 (D. Col. 1993), the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado fully adopted the rationale of the Wallace court and also refused to apply the
NLRA limitations period to a WARN cause of action. Id. at 654 ("[T]his court concludes that the
WARN Act is separate in scope and purpose from other aspects of federal labor law, and therefore the
assertion that the NLRA's § 10(b) limitations period should apply is rejected.").
88. 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Il1. 1993).
89. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
91. Santa Fe Terminal, 830 F. Supp. at 435-36.
92. See supra notes 22-23.
93. Santa Fe Terminal, 830 F. Supp. at 436. The court recognized that WARN's venue provision,
see supra note 27, allows an aggrieved employee to file suit in the state where the site is located or in
any state where the employer transacts business. Santa Fe Terminal, 830 F. Supp. at 436. However,
the court reasoned that choice of law rules would likely require a court to adopt the law of the state
where the site was located. Id. Thus, forum shopping was not a valid concern, as the law of the site
location would probably be used regardless of where the suit was filed. Id.
94. Santa Fe Terminal, 830 F. Supp. at 436. The court recognized the important distinction
between a continuing employer-employee relationship and one that has been severed. Id. The court
also agreed with the Wallace court, see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text, that WARN claims
are completely unrelated to collective bargaining procedures. Id. at 437.
95. Santa Fe Terminal, 830 F. Supp. at 436.
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NLRA limitations period.96
In United Papervorkers hiternational Union Local 340 v. Specialty
Paperboard, Inc.,97 the Second Circuit ruled that a WARN cause of
action is not one of the limited instances in which a court should borrow
a federal statute of limitations." Initially, the court reviewed Supreme
Court precedent and acknowledged the general rule that state limitations
should apply.99 The Second Circuit also agreed with courts that had been
reluctant to invoke a federal limitations period in every suit involving a
union.' Surveying its prior decisions, the Second Circuit noted that it
has borrowed the NLRA limitations period when claims "have directly
implicated the collective bargaining relationship."' 0 '
The United Paperworkers court next applied the two-part test originally
formulated in DelCostello0 2 and previously utilized by the Second Circuit
in Phelan. 3 The court examined the relationship between WARN and
the NLRA to evaluate whether the NLRA clearly constituted a closer
analogy than available state law.04 The court noted that Congress had
designed WARN to alleviate the distress of displaced workers and
emphasized WARN's simple complaint process."0 5  The court then
contrasted these important aspects of WARN with the NLRA's goal of
achieving labor peace through the collective bargaining process and the
NLRA's complex enforcement structure. 106 The court also acknowledged
96. Id. As none of the potentially analogous state statutes of limitations would have barred the
plaintiff's claim, the court found it unnecessary to choose a specific period. Id. Recently, in Wholesale
Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., 826 F. Supp. 326 (C.D. Cal. 1993), the
United States District Court for the Central District of California also declined to apply the NLRA
limitations period to a claim arising under WARN. However, the court based its decision on the
defendants' failure to properly raise the statute of limitations defense and did not reach the merits of
the issue. Id. at 330.
97. 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
98. Id. at 56.
99. "[W]hen a federal statute contains no limitations period, courts should 'borrow or absorb the
local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand."' Id. at 53 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, I1I S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991)).
100. The court approvingly cited Hoosier, DelCostello, and Reed as examples of courts that applied
state statutes of limitations to labor related claims. Id.
101. Id. at 54 (quoting Phelan v. Local 305, 973 F.2d 1050, 1060 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1415 (1993)).
102. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
103. Phelan, 973 F.2d at 1058-1061.
104. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 54-55. The available state law was Vermont's six year
statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. Id. at 52.
105. Id. at 54.
106. Id. at 54-55.
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that because the aggrieved employees have already been terminated, a
WARN claim typically does not involve a continuing employer-employee
relationship.'0 7  Finally, the court noted that Congress specifically
declared that it did not intend for WARN to affect any other labor
laws. ' 8 In light of these differences, the court concluded that the NLRA
was not closely analogous to WARN" 9 and declined to apply the
NLRA's six month statute of limitations to the plaintiffs' claim."0
Though the court had effectively decided the issue by holding that the
NLRA was not analogous to WARN," the court went on to consider
the second part of the DelCostello test' '-whether federal policy or the
practicalities of litigation make the application of state statutes problemat-
ic." 3 Noting that WARN gives rise to only one type of claim, the court
concluded that predictability does not mandate adopting a federal
limitations period.'14 Additionally, because WARN claims are limited to
a single site, the court reasoned that the advantages of forum shopping
would be minimal because courts would most likely apply the law of the
state where the injury took place."' Accordingly, the court determined
that the second part of the DelCostello test also militated against borrowing
the NLRA limitations period." 6
The Second Circuit correctly applied Supreme Court precedent in its
107. Id. at 55. The court noted that the process of filing a complaint under the NLRA is handled
by a National Labor Relations Board attorney. Id. Accordingly, there is comparatively less burden on
the plaintiffthan in a WARN action. Id. Also, because the Board hears all claims, conflicting statutes
of limitations might cause the Board undue hardship and confusion not normally present in a WARN
action. Id.
108. Id. at 55 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 2105 (1988)). See supra note 29.
109. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55. ("WARN, therefore, neither 'encourages nor
discourages' collective bargaining, thus differing in purpose from the NLRA.") (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 56.
I11. Id. at 55. The court also declined to apply the statute of limitations from the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 1992). Id.
112. 999 F.2d at 56. "In discussing the second part of the Phelan/DelCostello test, we do not mean
to imply that both parts need not be met. We only seek to be thorough in our discussion of WARN."
Id. at 56 n.8.
113. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
114. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56. The court contrasted WARN with RICO, which
requires a uniform limitations period because it encompasses many different potential predicate acts.
Id. See also Norwood, supra note 2, at 483-86.
115. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56. The injury would occur at the plant. Id. See supra
note 93.
116. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.
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decision." 7  Both the legislative history 8 and the language of the
statute itself1 9 show that Congress intended WARN to operate indepen-
dently from all pre-existing labor laws, including the NLRA. 20 Thus,
under the first prong of DelCostello,1 the NLRA is not more analogous
than state laws. Applying either the Lampf or DelCostello tests, 2 the
lack of a close analogy properly negates borrowing a federal statute of
limitations.
However, because WARN was intended to aid displaced workers by
giving them time to seek other employment or training before being
terminated, 124 applying a state statute of limitations of several years or
more does not serve the policy underlying WARN. Recovering damages
several years after being laid off will not help a terminated employee search
for immediate training or employment. Rather, these damages would
merely ameliorate the employee's general living conditions, a remedy
beyond the scope of WARN. Consequently, Congress should either
amend WARN to provide an appropriate statute of limitations in line with
its underlying purpose or courts should focus on the intended goals of
WARN when determining the proper state statute to apply.
A. Kent Mayo
117. The Second Circuit's well-reasoned opinion in United Paperworkers will likely influence
future WARN statute of limitations cases at the district court level. In United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., No. Civ. A. 92-5968, 1993 WL 374152 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1993), the first
district court case decided after United Paperworkers, the court fully adopted the reasoning of the
Second Circuit, ruling that Pennsylvania law provided the appropriate limitations period for civil suits
under the WARN Act. Id. at *3.
118. See supra notes 20, 26 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 67.
123. Each test is conjunctive such that if a case fails one prong, the court will not borrow the
federal limitation. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; O'Connor supra note 12, at 43-44.
125. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 43; supra note 20 and accompanying text; S. RP. No. 62,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987) ("The bill establishes a comprehensive system for providing prompt
adjustment and training services to dislocated workers.').
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